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What’s Sexual Violence Got 
To Do with the Economy? 
The Case of the DRC 
By Serena Cruz & Helen Hintjens 
The members of the Mapping Team 
were able to observe the constant fear on 
the part of affected populations that history would 
repeat itself, especially when yesterday’s attackers are 
returning in positions that enable them to commit new crimes 
with complete impunity.1 
 
Introduction 
Sex and money are ancient allies. And nowhere has the alliance 
between economic interests, violence, sexual violence, and 
forced labour been closer than in Congo-Kinshasa, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.  
 
At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, which carved up the 
African continent south of the Sahara, King Leopold of Belgium 
persuaded Western powers that he would oversee a “Free Congo,” 
where businesses from every corner could easily establish 
themselves and make a profit. Shortly after the conference, as 
Leopold’s company officials started arriving, an area larger than 
present-day Western Europe had been veritably turned over to 
one man. Soon the people who lived in what was now “Leopold’s 
Congo” were to discover the so-called free market norms of 
nineteenth-century imperialist capitalism – and the sting of its 
lash.  
 
Everyday economic activity became the single main cause of 
violent deaths, rapes, and mutilations of an estimated ten million 
people in the span of just a few decades. Several accounts, 
including Adam Hochschild’s book King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story 
of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (discussed more 
below), have given a wider audience a better understanding of 
how the personal story of Leopold, who never set foot in Congo, 
ensured that economic extraction and growth of the Congolese 
economy would be based on widespread, systematized physical 
violence, killings, whippings, and sexual violence. The notorious 
Force Publique, the colonial police force overseen by a few 
Belgian officers, did the king’s dirty work, enforcing punishments, 
as they themselves were under threat of sanctions. In eastern 
DRC, a particularly predatory form of armed capitalism still 
prevails. In this paper we propose that the unholy alliance of 
economic interests, forced labour, sexual predation, and killings 
that Leopold established from 1884 onwards resulted in structures 
of predatory, violence-based capital accumulation that persist 
today.  
 
Expanding the sphere of private economic interests and doing 
what is usually termed “economic development” may therefore 
prove altogether insufficient to reduce poverty, violence, and 
sexual violence. For the Congolese, it seems that deeper 
structural transformations will be needed before the economic 
and social structures can deliver peaceful forms of development.  
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This is because the economic infrastructure is underpinned by systematic physical violence, 
which includes pervasive sexual violence. Collusion with this predatory economy has produced 
a gendered economic machine that relies on physical and moral enslavement of the 
population. It uses sexual violence as a weapon of choice to discipline and terrorize fragile 
local communities and turn them against one another.2   
 
It is the extraction – first of rubber, later of timber and minerals – that has impelled this 
gendered economic system based on pillage and the bodily wastage of men and women. To 
tackle sexual violence, we propose, requires transforming the entire economic system, root 
and branch, even before it makes sense to tackle Congolese men’s masculinities or to promote 
gender equality through training and education. Only when alternatives to forced labor are 
found and made profitable will significant reform of Congo’s economic system be possible.  
 
So how did sexual violence become part and parcel of the economic and social infrastructure 
of the country? Let’s begin by tracing back some of the history of this gendered form of 
violence, starting with 1884.   
 
Women, Warriors, and Wars 
Scholars posit that the nexus between “security” and “development” has grown greater, 
notably since 2001. These two fields of operation overlap in ways previously not recognized or 
imagined. In eastern DRC, the military has become involved in development work as a part of 
the reconstruction process, and NGOs and humanitarian agencies also operate in insecure 
zones of fighting and violence, sometimes under private or UN military protection. Private 
companies play a growing role in security provision in such circumstances, often muddying the 
waters and generating, rather than reducing, insecurity.3 For Congo’s case, this comes as no 
surprise – in the country’s history, private armed forces have been the norm, not the 
exception. Under Leopold’s dominion, which lasted from 1884 till 1908, when the Belgian state 
took over the bankrupt colony, each private company involved paid dues. The funds were 
mainly for the Force Publique, which, in turn, used force to protect the companies’ 
investments. In eastern DRC especially, it is not that surprising: in light of a long history of 
predatory capitalism, closer relations between security and development tend to increase 
insecurity rather than feelings of security among the local population. In October 2014, when 
civilian survivors of an attack by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) turned to attack the UN 
compound in North Kivu, it was clear that their shattered expectations of finding protection 
under UN auspices had spilled over into rage. 
 
The mineral trade and sexual violence tend to follow one another, with pervasive and 
institutionalized practices of forced labor. Men, women, children, young and old, are 
conscripted as forced labor, made to work for nothing or next to nothing. Sexual violence, 
carried out in a way that is intended to destroy social bonds of family and loyalty, is often the 
prelude to enslavement and forced labor. Gender-based violence (GBV) and the forced 
fragmentation of communities thus go hand in hand. As individuals become unanchored from 
their support systems, wealth accumulation proceeds through sheer physical force.    
 
“Pillage capitalism” is thus deeply rooted, and continues to reproduce itself at the expense of 
the vast majority of the Congolese population. The economic and political “system… rewards 
illicit trade and discourages legal and stable commerce.4 In this context, sexual violence is not 
merely something men commit: it is symptomatic of deeply embedded structures that make up 
the coercive political economy. Overcoming legacies of inter-gender and inter-community 
violence is the major challenge in eastern DRC today, particularly for women. 
 
Although women from these communities have undoubtedly emerged and come to maintain 
informal positions of leadership, their roles as community leaders are seriously compromised 
by the pervasive physical threats against them. Yet, it seems to have taken at least 15 years to 
alert the world to the devastating impact of the poisonous legacies of an eastern DRC political 
economy on the lives of women. In acknowledgment, some recent signs of social change offer 
hope of growing awareness of the gendered nature of women’s place in local economies,  
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communities, and the larger political and economic nexus of DRC’s violent forms of 
production.5 
 
Central to exploitative production is the extraction of labor from men and women by force and 
captivity. As men are continually the first line of conscripted actors in the system of violent 
production, women are left to fend for their own safety, with few lines of support. What 
results is a means of coping, whereby “[a]longside these male-centered difficulties are new 
divisions of labor born out of the conflict” and whereby “[w]omen are often more likely to be 
involved in small commercial activities.”6 Witnessing incremental changes to localized intra-
community gender norms of power “has been interpreted by men as breeding female 
emancipation at the expense of male authority.”7 Punishment for being independent is never 
far away for those women who manage to exercise relative economic independence.  
 
As the perception that women are “moving ahead” is allowed to flourish, sexual violence 
competes alongside women’s abilities to develop as local leaders. Many young men are unable 
to get a “decent” living or marry, and, for them, a gun may become a means of livelihood. 
They may seize others’ land, coerce unarmed people to work for them in mines, and use 
sexual violence and threat of arms to achieve their goal of making a living “as a man.”8 In this 
context, civilians and military, alike, can become forced laborers, as “losers… become slaves, 
and…an entire group can be forced to give up its corporate integrity [including] its claim to 
[an] autonomous control over women.”9 As such, the armed war economy ensures that violent 
conflict will re-emerge at the locus of women’s bodies. Sexual violence is also a means 
through which claims to livelihood are staked out by competing armed actors, economic as 
well as military, in the search for low-cost or enslaved labor for mines, transport, and armed 
groups. 
 
In an effort to thwart the dichotomizing notion of gendered power, entrenched in local 
communities, women survivors of sexual violence are organizing collective actions to protest 
their mass violation. In 2010, women survivors gathered in Bukavu to confront violence against 
women. Known as “V-Day,” the event was meant to spotlight their plight to the international 
community. The women called for an end to sexual violence, an end to impunity for 
perpetrators, and breaking taboos that engender shame in victims. They also demanded: 
“[T]he international community must act on behalf of Congolese women and girls whether or 
not it serves their economic or political self-interest.” This instance made it clear that 
Congolese women, themselves, were connecting the ways in which the production systems in 
eastern DRC operate as part of an economy of violence. They also endeavored to show how 
systematic sexual violence had become part and parcel of a normalized violence in the 
production system overseen by military forces. 
 
Sexual Violence and the Profit Motive: A Short History  
Sexual violence thus has multiple meanings, causes, and consequences. In DRC, most sexual 
violence does seem embedded in wider patterns of using physical force, or violence, to push 
people about and earn money off their sweat. Local communities are forced to give their labor 
for free, to work in dangerous conditions for nothing or next to nothing, in mines and within 
armed militias.10 Masculine ideals have been profoundly affected by historical practices of 
coercive labor and a violent sexual economy, which interconnects forced laboring with all 
other aspects of reproduction, especially in mining and forest areas.11 War-based political 
economies of eastern DRC’s regions, such as North and South Kivu and Ituri, reflect in many 
ways a typical pattern firmly established by colonial forms coerced labor systems, starting 
with Leopold’s “rubber terror.”12 
 
The longer-term historical analysis adopted in this paper highlights strong precedents for what 
is being documented today by NGOs and human rights organizations. That is, a complex nexus 
of human insecurity, sexual violence, and labor enslavement for economic gain. There are 
similarities to be drawn with the slave plantations of the southern United States, 
characterized by brutal acts comparable to those found in colonial Congo, except that in 
Congo entire settled communities were involved.13 
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American plantation owners, like Leopold’s agents, relied on physical and sexual violence and 
the threat of violence to extract surplus and make a profit. 
The colonial regime, the regime of Mobutu and the rebellions of the Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo [ADFL, led by Laurent Kabila] 
and the RCD have each demonstrated that force is the means to power.14 
 
The prevalence of forced labor, imposed taxes, with inadequate or no pay, continues today, 
usually under the barrel of a gun. In colonial times, the whip and the gun both reigned 
supreme, impelled, in turn, by the profit motive.15 Under Leopold, an economic logic became 
entrenched that explicitly involved sexual violence, which was recorded as a practice of the 
Force Publique, the Congolese police force, and various company agents. Kidnapping village 
females en masse was almost routine under Leopold’s regime, a way to force village men to 
supply rubber to the company. Abductees would be kept, caged like animals, until the men 
returned with the requisite quantity of rubber. If enough rubber was collected, the village 
females were returned. In other cases, they died, were killed, raped, and/or starved. The 
level of violence was such that many communities fled in the wake of Force Publique soldiers’ 
advance, yielding a despoiled landscape in some parts of the country.16 Those who refused to 
comply or brought insufficient rubber could be punished through the organized raping and 
killing of their wives and the killing of children and elders.17 
 
As its violent past haunts the US today, so do the ghosts of a colonial past plague the 
Congolese. Legacies of colonialism remain brutally visible in specific violent methods used to 
coerce local people to collect and deliver services – be it forest timber, minerals, or violence 
itself as a forced militia member. It is important to understand the gender dimensions of this 
comparison. Dorothy Roberts, for example, brings to light the corporeal realities of US 
slavery, and in many ways this, too, took place at the locus of women’s bodies.18 Community 
coherence cannot survive amidst the dismemberment of people and the burning of their 
homes and crops as punishment for disobedience or to sow terror and persuade them to work 
for nothing.19  
 
In Congo today, village men who fail to obey the mineral delivery instructions of armed 
groups, be they Congolese soldiers, militias, or their own civilian employers, can be punished. 
The punishment can include their own rape and the rape of women from their families and 
villages. Local leaders are still being killed with impunity. As during the Leopold era, the 
overall effect is to generate terror – a constant sense of menace from the state and private 
armed actors, which ensures compliance most of the time from most of the population to the 
dominant forces controlling the guns and resources. Like US slavery, the rape of Congolese 
women intersects with a thriving system of economic coercion and gain that turns massive 
profits for a few. In the Deep South and in eastern Congo, both, it is no exaggeration to say 
that “women’s bodies are the battleground of…economic war.”20  
 
Under Leopold, laws requiring absolute obedience from all “native” people effectively 
allowed cruel punishment and violence to go unpunished. Local agents representing the king 
and commercial companies could exercise extreme violence, including public whippings, the 
chaining together of people, and forcing natives to do the most dangerous kind of work. 
Overseen by European agents working for various companies and for the king, the Force 
Publique itself was composed of Africans who were recruited by force and through 
kidnappings.21 
 
In this way, the conditions under which Congo’s communities exist – one of constant “threat of 
violence or other forms of punishment” – is nothing new.22 The kinds of threats, cruel acts of 
public physical punishment, and sexual violence as a weapon of social regulation, parallel the 
well-documented economy of entrenched violence and communal control that occurred in the 
US from the period of legalized slavery on through the Jim Crow-ruled South, which scholars 
argues continues to this day.23 
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In 2010, it was estimated that almost half the working population of eastern DRC involved in 
mining had been in a situation of forced labor (in some cases amounting to slavery) at some 
point over the previous two years.24 It is documented that “in the Kivu provinces, almost every 
mining deposit [was] controlled by a military group,”25 according to the UN Group of Experts on 
the DRC. Reports abound concerning DRC’s enslaving economy. According to UNICEF, child 
labor remains common in DRC, and “more than a quarter of children aged 5 to 14 are 
working,” many in slavery-like conditions.26 One Amnesty International report showed evidence 
of harvest looting, medical supply and food aid theft, extortion and “taxation” of civilians, 
forced labor, and displacement all performed in combination with sexual exploitation.27  
 
A case in point comes from the Rwandan post-genocide period in eastern DRC. In 2002, a boom 
in coltan mining saw famers shifting “into mining communities,” whereby they began 
“exploiting their own lands, selling it in concessions to speculators or dispersing as itinerant 
miners.” According to Amnesty International, an “estimated 95 per cent of those involved were 
drawn from the region’s rural poor, and civilian miners may have numbered up to 50,000 
during the boom.”28 This movement of people has brought with it the “seemingly unstoppable 
flow of small arms and light weapons into the region,” helping to fuel armed conflict and 
militia operations.29 Rather than food, weapons are stockpiled in silos, and small arms are 
common currency throughout the region. 
 
Middlemen control communication with outside traders and markets. They are in a privileged 
position, helping to set terms and conditions along this commodity chain. Wherever possible, 
military forces control mines directly. Soldiers of all stripes are paid low wages, if any. “The 
buyer pays the leader of the armed group for the transport, and the commander then sends out 
troops to abduct and force individuals to carry the bags, without pay or choice.”30 This is how 
the system in Congo works today, similarly to over a century ago.   
 
Under Leopold, exploitation was mostly confined to the coffers of the king and eventually the 
Belgian colonial regime. Today global networks in mineral trading overlap where the needs of 
armed groups and humanitarian organizations are concerned. As Austin reveals: 
Cargo companies based in Europe, South Africa and China that have been involved in 
the shipments of military equipment to governments or sub-state actors in the Great 
Lakes area have also been contracted to carry humanitarian relief supplies for some of 
the international aid agencies.31  
 
Senior army and government officials in Uganda, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe have been involved in 
trading minerals mined illegally in DRC. While all deny their involvement, the minerals from 
Congo still: “end up for sale in jewelers across the globe, and [in]…our mobile phones.”32 
Legitimate global businesses are the main buyers of resources mined in DRC. Mining remains at 
the heart of the Congolese economy, providing three quarters of DRC’s export revenue and 
employing an estimated million workers. Yet among them, only 35,000 are formally 
registered.33 
 
Winds of Change?  
Up until recently, it seemed that DRC would exist in limbo where international accountability 
for resource extraction was concerned. Ideally, such accountability would foresee: 
international measures to ensure that…global companies are not undermining poverty 
reduction goals by maximizing their profits through negotiating tax exemptions, skewed 
profit sharing arrangements, or cutting corners on property rights, human rights, 
environmental and labor standards.34  
 
For too long since the formal end of Belgian control, global economic interests have continued 
to override genuine concern for the wellbeing of Congolese people. And yet, change is 
seemingly on the rise. Recently, the Enough Project made claims that demilitarization is 
rapidly happening in all mineral mines in eastern DRC except in the gold sector.35 	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All phone- and computer-related rare minerals are, it seems, now being traded “freely,” 
without the mines being controlled by armed soldiers who can use violence on civilians to 
enforce their exclusive control.  
 
Enforcement of Section 1502 – based on an earlier conflict minerals bill forwarded by then US 
senator Barack Obama, of the much larger Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act – has at least raised the issue of the violence caused by historical investment in 
present-day DRC. Section 1502 was finally passed by US Congress in 2012, aiming “to create 
clean and transparent supply chains that do not source minerals from conflict mines in eastern 
Congo or contribute to the ongoing violence by indirectly funding armed groups.”36 Some might 
say this is rather rich, given that US and other Western corporations have, from the start, 
determined the violent predatory economic system in place in Congo. However, this provision 
does provide for the traceability of most minerals mined in eastern DRC.  
According to research by the Washington, DC-based Enough Project, an advocacy organization 
created in 2006 by Africa experts, by 2014, armed groups were no longer controlling the mines 
or trading ICT-related minerals through force of arms in mines, at least in the Kivus and Ituri. 
In a footnote, an Enough Project report explains that control of mines by armed groups is no 
longer the norm thanks to a strategy that involved huge multinational companies, from Apple 
and Google to Nokia and Philips, as well as the Congolese mining cooperative.37 Of course, the 
creation of a watchdog-cum-advocacy group that “conducts field research in conflict zones, 
develops and advocates for policy recommendations, supports social movements in affected 
countries, and mobilizes public campaigns” also reflects the interests of US capital in securing 
so-called clean minerals to avoid consumer complaints. “Celebrity upstanders” are cited on 
the Enough Project website as supporters of its work in “Congo, Sudan, and communities 
affected by the LRA.”  
The report expresses the discourse of “clean consumerism” incentivizing most efforts 
nowadays to discipline corporate capitalism internationally.  
We at the Enough Project believe that companies that use conflict minerals—mainly 
electronics and jewelry companies—should thoroughly trace and audit their supply 
chains to ensure that their products are not financing atrocities in eastern Congo. In 
addition, it is critical to build up a clean minerals trade in Congo so that miners can 
work in decent conditions, and the minerals can go toward benefiting communities 
instead of warlords. The certification system for minerals in Congo and the region must 
be strengthened so that companies can purchase clean, conflict-free minerals from 
Congo and the region.38 
Meanwhile, the Enough Project’s website also cites: 
Rules and regulations for companies affected by 1502 were supposed to be released on 
April 17, 2011, along with a rule requiring oil, gas, and mining companies to disclose 
payments to governments. However, delays caused by companies, bureaucratic 
processes, and the threat of a lawsuit by the Chamber of Commerce have pushed back 
the release of the rules for a full year.  
 
After one year’s delay and threats from industry, the proposal for these regulations was 
adopted in 2012. Following this logic, if the Dodd-Frank provisions on IT-related conflict 
minerals are indeed having a positive impact on the reduction of violence in the Kivus and 
Ituri, as is claimed, then we expect a crucial corollary. That is, we should also witness a 
reduction in sexual violence, which we have suggested follows a mainly economics logic. As 
women’s organizations in eastern DRC seek to promote respect for gender-based justice, 
bringing those accused of rape to trial, however painfully slowly this is happening, it is to be 
hoped that norms of social relations can start to move away from the use of routine violence 
to achieve ‘normal’ economic ends of gaining a workforce, or finding a market outlet.39 	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If these winds of change are to mean much on the ground in DRC, they will need to be 
centered on the views and growing mobilization of local civilians. This particularly concerns 
women, but also includes in its equation men, clergy, and human rights activists, who are 
constantly challenging the making of money through routinized physical violence. The 
majority’s exclusion from safety, security, basic levels of wealth – all of which is appropriated 
by a tiny minority and key global economic actors – means that wealth is still visibly and 
violently acquired on the backs of the poor. On top of that, sexual violence is endemic to this 
systematized use of force.  
 
To be held captive solely for the purposes of profit for various global and local interests is 
nobody’s destiny or duty. Enslavement cannot be gently reformed through gentlemen’s 
agreements – too many interests are at stake. It is vital, therefore, to pay more attention to 
what women themselves are saying in eastern DRC and across the region. Doing so, we are 
likelier to grasp how economic interests, global trade, and sexual violence are viewed from 
within today’s eastern DRC, and how this long-standing nexus can eventually be broken.40 
 
Arguably, the single major obstacle to peace and justice in DRC, especially in the country’s 
east, is an economic system that is still based, like the colonial pillage economy, on forced 
labor, sexual assault, and a combination of physical coercion of every kind by armed economic 
actors. In the long-term, “a complete reform of the economic, political, and social structures 
of the DRC is necessary to tackle the problems of underdevelopment and poverty.” Where 
sexual violence is concerned, recent legislative reforms at least hold a candle for positive 
change in the workings of the liberal empire.41 	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